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Comments and Casenotes
LARCENY IN MARYLAND - A CRIME AGAINST
OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION?
By ROBERT S. FERTITTA
Two Maryland cases", 2 raise an interesting question:
Does the Maryland Court of Appeals consider larceny to
be a crime against ownership or a crime against possession?
In Sippio, a truck driver employed by the Panzer Pickle
Co. was parked at a street corner after having made several
deliveries for his employer. Three boys approached the
truck and, during the course of a conversation with the
driver, one boy opened the truck door, grabbed a money
box and ran away. The defendant was identified as one of
the three boys. The indictment charged the defendant with
stealing $201.44 belonging to the Panzer Pickle Co., Inc.
On appeal from a judgment of conviction, the defendant
contended that the state had neither proved, as alleged in
the indictment, that the Panzer Pickle Co. was a corpora-
tion nor that it "owned" the stolen property. In reversing,
the Court of Appeals held that, while in a criminal prose-
cution "formal proof"3 of a corporation's existence was not
necessary, the one specific mention of the :company name
in the testimony without referring to it as. a corporation
was insufficient,4 and that satisfactory proof of ownership
of the stolen property, an essential element -in. the proof of
the crime of larceny, was wholly lacking.5
Sippio v. State, 227 Md. 449, 177 A. 2d 261 (1962).
2 Wersten v. State, 228 Md. 226, 179 A. 2d 364 (1962).
I See also Richardson v. State, 221 Md. S5, 156 A. 2d 436 (1959). This
case stated that formal proof - such as corporation papers - is un-
necessary in a criminal prosecution. The court said a orpdration's exist-
ence might be proven orally or even by reputation.4 The fact that 'the Panzer Pickle Co. was a corporation was never men-
tioned during the trial. Indeed, the company name was only mentioned
once in the course of the entire trial: first question of the driver's direct
examination "you are employed by the Panzer Pickle Company ...?" See
Brief for Appellant, p. E. 3, Sippio v. State, 227 Md. 449, 177 A. 2d 261
(1962). However, in Richardson v. State, ibid., the company was mentioned
several times as a corporation without objection by the prosecution. The
court in Richardson said that this was sufficient proof of its existence.
In fact the court found that there was a complete absence of direct
evidence that the money belonged to the company. The court said that the
implications of the testimony were thart the money belonged to the truck
driver. During the testimony of the driver he was asked: "Did anything
unusual happen to you that day?" He answered, "Yes, I was robbed." See
Brief for Appellant, p. E. 4, Sippio v. State, 227 Md. 449, 177 A. 2d
261 (1962).
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In Wersten the defendant was charged with the crimes
of breaking and entering the storehouse of one Chris Neu-
meister and with the larceny of Neumeister's property
from a safe in the storehouse. Evidence introduced by the
state at the trial indicated (1) that the premises were occu-
pied by the Eichenkranz Society, an incorporated restau-
rant, (2) that the goods allegedly stolen were the property
of the corporation, and (3) that Chris Neumeister, rather
than being an occupier of the premises and owner of the
goods, was merely an employee of the corporation.' In
reversing the lower court conviction, the Court of Appeals
held that the state did not develop "the actual ownership
of the property involved, and [did not develop] whether
Neumeister had a sufficient interest or special property
therein to permit ownership to have been laid in him."'
The court reviewed its earlier decisions involving larceny
and reiterated "that an allegation of the ownership of the
property alleged to have been stolen is a necessary requisite
in a larceny indictment .. .and proof of ownership as
laid in the indictment is an essential factor to justify a
conviction."
The consistent use of and the apparent importance given
to the word ownership in the Maryland decisions9 involving
the crime of larceny suggests that Maryland's require-
ments for larceny may differ from those stated in the
traditional common law definition of the crime.
At common law, larceny was "the felonious taking and
carrying away of the personal goods of another."'" A
modern textwriter defines larceny as "the trespassory tak-
ing and carrying away of the personal property of another
with intent to steal same."" The use of the term "of an-
other" seems to refer to possession, as might be expected
from the nature of trespass. Professor Perkins has said,
"larceny involves the act of wrongful dispossession, the
vital question is not who has title . . .but who has the
legally-recognized possession."" Thus, a person with title
to property can commit larceny of the property by taking
0Mr. Neumeister war the manager of the corporation's enterprise, the
restaurant.
7 228 Md., at 229. Note that here it would seem that the court is saying
that actual ownership - title - is not necessary for ownership to be laid
in a person.
8Id. at 228.
" See note 17 infra.
104 BLACKSTONg, COMMENTARms 230 (Lewis ed. 1898). (Emphasis added.)
PFrnXINS, CRIMINAL LAw 190 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
1d., 195.
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it from a person who is in rightful possession.13 No dissent
from the rule as it is stated by Professor Perkins has been
found among the treatise writers.1 4 The Maryland Court
of Appeals has made statements to the effect that proof
of ownership is an essential element of the crime of lar-
ceny, 15 and the court requires that an indictment for lar-
ceny contain an allegation of ownership.1 6 The question
presented is what the court means or may mean when it
182 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW 603 (9th ed. 1923): "[A]n article may be
stolen from one who is either the general or special owner of it." MAY, LAW
Op CRIMES § 237, at 343 (4th ed. 1938): "A general owner may be guilty
of larceny of his own goods, if at the time of itaking he has no right to
their possession ... "
14 CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES § 12.03, at 724 (6th ed. 1958):
"To constitute larceny, the goods taken must be the property of another
than the accused. . . . It is not meant by this, however, that the general
ownership must necessarily be in another. A special ownership or possession
is enough." (Emphasis added.) Id., § 12.00 at 707: "Trespass against
possession is the matrix of the simple common-law larceny concept. * * *
The [early] English cases . . . mirror a judicial struggle to ascertain who
has possession. Obviously, then, an accused cannot, in legal contemplation,
trespass against a person's property, if that person does not have posses-
sion." (Emphasis added.)
An English authority, although making it clear that larceny is a crime
against possession, implies that the word "owner" - though loosely con-
strued - Is still used to describe the larceny victim in England. TURNER,
KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 227, at 257 (18th ed. 1962) : "Lar-
ceny was always conceived as an offense against possession, and naturally
so, since English law has never recognized in a subject of the realm any
absolute right of ownership of chattels, our 'owner' being merely the person
who has the best right to possess the thing."5 E.g., see statement of facts of principal cases in body.
182 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1172, at 1491 (12th ed. 1932) states the
requirement as it should be: "To sustain an indictment for larceny, the
goods alleged to have been stolen must be proved to be either the absolute
or special property of the alleged owner. . . ." Id., § 1177, at 1495-96:
"General owner may be charged with stealing from special owner ...
[O]ne having the property [title] in goods may be guilty of larceny in
stealing them from one to whom [e.g., a bailee] he has given them in
custody as special possession. In such case ownership must be laid in the
bailee." Id., § 1179, at 1497: "As against strangers, property [here Wharton
probably means ownership] may be laid either in bailor or bailee."
'But another writer seems to recognize -at least a practice of alleging
ownership, since he finds it necessary to state: "A general or special
ownership by another is sufficient to sustain the allegation that the property
Is his. Even a thief has sufficient ownership to support the allegation as
against another thief." MAY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 245, at 351.
Also see: JoycE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GovERixNo INDICTMENTS § 427,
at 487-89 (2d ed. 1924) :
"There are some offenses, such as larceny or embezzlement, where
the criminal act is directed against the personal property of another,
and in charging which, it is essential to the sufficiency of an indict-
ment, that,. in describing the property affected, there should be an aver-
ment of ownership, custody or possession. So to constitute a good
indictment for larceny the thing stolen must be charged to be the
property of the actual owner, or of a person having a special property
as bailee, and from whose possession it was stolen. * * * In the appli-
cation of this rule it has been held sufficient under the facts of par-
ticular cases to lay the ownership of property in the one having the
lawful possession....
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uses the word "ownership" rather than the word "posses-
sion" in its discussions of the crime of larceny. To facili-
tate the present discussion, four possible reasons for the
court's use of the word "ownership" are set forth. Although
they are treated separately, it should be noted at the out-
set that any combination of the four may in fact be the
reason for the use of the word in a given instance.
I. IN MARYLAND LARCENY IS A CRIME
AGAINST TITLE
When a person states that he "owns" certain property
he is usually understood to mean that he has "title" to the
property. Since the Court of Appeals uses the word "owner-
ship" without defining it, it might be assumed that it in-
tends this commonly understood meaning. If it does, and
thus interprets the crime of larceny as being one against
title, the court is in direct conflict with the text authorities.
Because of the seriousness of such a conflict, a close scrutiny
of several Maryland larceny cases would be valuable at
this point.
Although many cases have discussed larceny in terms of
ownership, 7 the clearest statement of the requirement of
an allegation of ownership is found in State v. King,8
where, in reference to larceny indictments, the court stated
that "among the essential requisites of an indictment for
larceny is a sufficient allegation of ownership."' 9 The court
did not attempt to explain what would be a "sufficient alle-
I See, e.g., Putinski v. State, 223 Md. 1, 161 A. 2d 117, 82 A.L.R. 2d 859
(1960) ; Richardson v. State, 221 Md. 85, 156 A. 2d 436 (1959) ; Murray
v. State, 214 Md. 383, 135 A. 2d 314 (1957) ; Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162,
155 Atl. 153 (1931) ; State v. Barnett, 148 Md. 153, 128 Atl. 744 (1925) ;
State v. McNally, 55 Md. 559 (1881) ; and two non-larceny cases: State v.
Tracey, 73 Md. 447, 21 Atl. 366 (1891), an embezzlement case reciting the
requirement for larceny indictments; and State v. Blizzard, 70 Md. 385, 17
Atl. 270 (1889), a case dealing with obtaining property by false pretenses
reciting the requirement for larceny indictments. See also two English
cases cited therein: Reg. v. Martin, 8 Ad. & E. 481, 112 Eng. Rep. 921
(1838) and -Sill v. R-, 1 El. & BI. 553, 118 Eng. Rep. 542 (1853), particularly
Lord Campbell's opinion at 556.
Is95 Md. 125, 51 Atl. 1102 (1902). The question in this case was whether
an indictment was demurrable which described money as "goods and
chaittels" in the clause alleging ownership. The court's answer was that
it was not.
1 Id. at 128. The King case, after quoting the following statement, relat-
ing to criminal indictments generally, from Kearney v. State, 48 Md. 16, 24
(1877) : "It has always been held that it is an essential requisite in every
indictment that it should allege all matters material to constitute the
particular crime charged with such positiveness and directness as not to
need the aid of intendment or implication" stated: "We may supplement
this here by saying it is also held by all the authorities that among the
'essential requisites' of an indictment for larceny is a sufficient allegation
of ownership."
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gation of ownership." One of the reasons given by the
court in King for this requirement was "that the Court
must be able to determine judicially that the property
alleged to have been stolen was the property of another
and not the property of the accused, and it is therefore
essentially descriptive of the crime charged. '20 Here again,
as with the word "ownership", the court uses words that
connote "title", i.e., by using the words "property of".
Considering for a moment that larceny traditionally is a
crime against "rightful possession", it is possible that the
court, taking cognizance of this view, meant only that the
court must be able to determine that the defendant had no
right to possession. But by using the term "property of"
the court seems to have been thinking in terms of title and
not in terms of rightful possession.
While King, by the use of the terms "ownership" and
"property of", raises the possibility that the court was
thinking in terms of title, a later case seemed to make such
an interpretation probable. In Canton National Bank v.
American Bonding and Trust Co.,2 the court stated that
"[i]n every larceny there must also be a taking and a tres-
pass, that is to say, there must be a taking from the posses-
sion of the owner against his will."2 By the use of the word
"owner" in such a manner, there is little room to argue that
the court meant something less than the title holder.
Although there are many other larceny cases where
such terms as "ownership", "owner", and "property of"
are used by the court in such a way as to imply title with-
0 Supra note 19. (Emphasis added.) See also Hearn v. State, 55 So. 2d
559, 561, 28 A.L.R. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1951). The Hearn case states its reason
this way: "The names of the owners of the stolen property constitute no
part 'of the offense. They are stated ... [in the indictment] primarily as a
matter of description for the purpose of identification and to show
ownership in a person or persons other than the accused." (Emphasis
added.)
111 Md. 41, 73 Atl. 684 (1909).
2 Id. at 45. This was a suit by the Bank against its surety on a surety
bond. Under the terms of the bond the surety ugreed to reimburse the
Bank for any loss caused by conduct of an employee which amounted to
larceny or embezzlement. The Bank alleged several acts of its cashier
which it contended amlounted to larceny. The court's decision was con-
cerned primarily with whether or not the specified acts amounted to
larceny. The cashier was alleged to have written many drafts on accounts
of depositors of the Bank and then authorized, a teller to pay the drafts to
third persons when in fact the accounts drawn on did not have sufficient
funds to cover them. The court held that these allegatibns were not
sufficient to show larceny since if the teller had full knowledge of the
circumstances the cashier would merely be an accessory before the fact.
But more important for present purposes, the court also held that there
was no specific allegation that the money paid out came out of the Bank's
funds. The statement quoted here was made by the court in defining
larceny. Query: Considering these details of the case, did the court intend
the quoted statement to mean what it seems to mean on its face?
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out much hint of a contrary implication, 3 the case of
Richardson v. State2 4 seems to clarify the Maryland posi-
tion. The facts of this case are of particular interest. The
Pleasant Valley Shoe Co. had delivered some of its mer-
chandise to Horn's Motor Express, Inc., in Baltimore for
shipment to an out-of-state customer of the Shoe Co. The
merchandise was taken from one of Horn's sealed trucks
while parked at its platform in Baltimore. Ownership in
the indictment was laid in Horn's Motor Express, Inc. The
evidence at the trial, however, showed that in fact the
Shoe Co. had title to the goods. The Court of Appeals, after
quoting the requirement of "sufficient allegation of owner-
ship" from King and also the reasons for the require-
ment, stated:
"However, it is generally held that in a prosecution
for larceny, an allegation of the ownership of stolen
goods is supported by proof of any legal interest or
special property in the goods, as, for instance, where
the person named in the indictment is in lawful posses-
sion as a bailee or common carrier. '25
It appears that the court in Richardson interpreted the
words used in King - "sufficient allegation of owner-
ship" - to mean "allegation of sufficient ownership", and
further held that "any legal interest or special property
in the goods" would be sufficient ownership.26 "Special
property" has been defined as "Property of a qualified, tem-
porary, or limited nature; as distinguished from absolute,
general, or unconditional property. Such is the property
of a bailee in the article bailed, of a sheriff in goods tem-
porarily in his hands under a levy, of the finder of lost
goods while looking for the owner... '27
In Richardson the court held that ownership was prop-
erly laid in Horn's Express, Inc. It seems clear that Horn's
interest fits into the definition of "special property". A re-
examination of the court's holding in Wersten shows that
the court said that the state did not "develop the actual
ownership of the property involved, and [did not develop]
whether Neumeister had a sufficient interest or special
property therein to permit ownership to have been laid in
him. '28 In Wersten the indictment laid the ownership of
2 See cases cited note 17 supra.2 221 Md. 85, 156 A. 2d 436 (1959).
5 Id. at 88.
2See, 2 WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 1070, at 1881 (11th ed.
1935) : "The possession of the property stolen and the right to possession
have been held sufficient to sustain the allegation [of ownership]."
17BLcK, LAw DICTIONARY 1383 (4th ed. 1957).
28228 Md. 226, 229, 179 A. 2d 364 (1962).
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the property in the manager of the corporation that had
title to the property. It would appear that he was in "right-
ful possession" of the property or, in other words, had a
"special property" in the money. Perhaps, then, if the
state in Wersten had "developed" this "special property"
in more detail, the court would have held the allegation
and proof sufficient.
The important point is that it seems almost certain after
Richardson that the court is not thinking in terms of title
when it uses the word "ownership". However, some doubt
still remains, since even in Richardson the court recited
the requirement that an allegation of ownership is essen-
tial. Why is not an allegation of rightful possession enough?
Perhaps because the court still believes larceny to be
basically a crime against title, with certain exceptions, as
in the case of a bailee or common carrier. No matter how
doubtful this last possibility may seem to be, the continued
use of the word "ownership" by the court still connotes
title. Apparently the court sees no problem in its use of
such a vague term since the court has made no further
attempt to clarify its meaning or substitute a more realistic
requirement in larceny cases. 29
II. To BE THE SUBJECT OF LARCENY GOODS
MUST BE OWNED BY SOMEONE
It is possible that the court uses the word "ownership" to
mean title when it requires an allegation of ownership
in the indictment to satisfy the basic rule that, in order
for property to be the subject of larceny, someone must
actually own it,3" i.e., have legal title to it. Abandoned
property cannot be the subject of larceny since it has no
owner.31 However, the identity of the owner need not be
known, with the result that lost property can be the sub-ject of larceny.32 In a case where the identity of the owner
is not known, it would seem that the court might allow
proof that the holder of the goods was in rightful possession
to sustain the allegation that "ownership" was in him
under the holding of Richardson. But in Richardson the
title holder was known and the problem there was whether
I See Byrd v. State, 229 Md. 148, 182 A. 2d 47 (1962). This case involved
larceny of an automobile. The defendant contended that the state failed
to prove the existence of the corporation alleged as the owner of the auto,
and that the state also failed to prove "ownership". In a per curiAm
decision the court dismissed the appeal, citing the Richardson, Sippio and
Wersten cases. See also Hardison v. State, 229 Md. 291, 182 A. 2d 487 (1962).10See, HOCiHriMER, LAW OF CRIMES & CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 393 (2d
ed. 1904).3 Ibid.
82 See PERKINs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 205.
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the holder of the goods had sufficient interest in the goods
to allow "ownership" to be laid in him. The argument
that the court means that the allegation of ownership is
necessary to satisfy the rule that the goods are not aban-
doned and that it does not mean that larceny is a crime
against title is weaker because of the fact that in cases
such as Sippio and Wersten there seemed to be little doubt
that the goods were not abandoned. The court in those
cases seemed to be more interested in who had title to the
goods rather than if anyone had title. It seems unlikely
that the court means nothing more than that the goods
must be shown not to be abandoned.
III. THE REQUIREMFNT IS ONE OF FAIR
PROCEDURE
It is quite possible that the requirement of an allegation
of ownership has nothing to do with the substantive crime
of larceny. The requirement might have been instituted
as a matter of fair criminal procedure. Arguably, there is
nothing more than a requirement that the defendant is
entitled to know whose property he is supposed to have
stolen, and that this property can best be identified in
terms of ownership. There is language in State v. King33
to support this, as one of the reasons for the requirement of
an allegation of ownership: "[T]he accused is entitled to
be informed of the exact accusation against him." 4
The facts of both Sippio and Wersten seem to support
this argument. In both cases there seemed to be ample
proof of an agency relationship between the apparent title
holder and the person holding the property. Whenever an
agency relationship exists, the question arises whether the
agent, servant or employee had possession of the property
or merely custody. Without going into the distinctions
between agents, servants and employees, it should be noted
that servants usually have only the custody of property
received from their masters.35 The possession in such a
case is said to remain in the master. However, an agent
usually has possession of the property owned by his prin-
cipal.3 6 The distinction seems to depend on the amount
of trust and confidence between an agent and principal.
Depending on the circumstances of a given situation, an
employee may have custody of some property of his em-
ployer and possession of other property of his employer.
- 95 Md. 125, 51 At. 1102 (1902).
SId. at 128.
See P~mKIs, op. Cit. supra note 11, at 197-98.3 6Ibid.
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Since larceny traditionally is a crime against the person
in rightful possession, it is important for the defendant to
know exactly what the relationship was between the per-
son or corporation with title to the goods and the person
in whose hands the goods were at the time of the taking.
If the holder of the property merely has custody of the
goods, an indictment laying "ownership" in him would
appear to be defective even if "ownership" is interpreted
to mean "rightful possession". In such a case "ownership"
would have to be laid in the master. There is little doubt
that the defendant is entitled to know against whom he has
allegedly committed larceny, but if this is the reason for
the requirement, the court has made no attempt to say so.
IV. MISINTERPRETATION By LATER COURTS
OF REQUIREMENTS ORIGINATED
MUCH EARLIER
The fourth possible reason for the court's use of the
word "ownership" is that it came into use accidentally in
the many cases where goods were stolen directly from the
person who had the legal title and who was also in right-
ful possession. It is not difficult to conceive how courts,
confronted with the same situation so often, began to
describe the property right violated as ownership. From
frequent usage, it might have come to be mistakenly sup-
posed that ownership must be alleged in the indictment,"
that proof of title, rather than proof of possession, is at
the heart of the crime, and that allowing proof of posses-
sion instead is a relaxation of the "original" rule dealing
with ownership." If this is the reason for the court's use
", An examination of the larceny indictment forms used by Maryland
State's Attorney's offices furnishes little help in determining if there is
a reason for the requirement, because of the simplicity of the language:
"of the goods and chattels, moneys and properties of. . . ." (Emphasis
added.) It is difficult to imagine from examining this phrase that the
word "of" would mean that the state's attorney would have to insert the
owner's name following it. It could just as easily be interpreted to mean
in the rightful possession of. Little aid is forthcoming from the Maryland
statutory law relating to indictments, since no requirement of alleging
ownership is contained in these provisions. 3 MD. CODE Art. 27, § 603 ff.
(1957). Although the word "owner" is used several times in the Maryland
statutory law relating to larceny, there is no specific statement that an
allegation of ownership is an essential element of the crime. 3 MD. CODE
Art. 27, §§ 340-53 (1957).
m In 1916 the English Larceny Act recognized the possibility of confusion.
See: ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 540
(32nd ed. 1949) :
"The essence of larceny is the taking of property without the con-
sent of the owner, but the expression 'owner' is not limited to the
person who is legal owner of the property stolen. By section 1 (2) (iii)
of the Larceny Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50), 'owner' is defined to
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of the word ownership, the court should correct the acci-
dent of time and circumstances by simply abandoning
its use.
V. Is IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION IN
LARCENY CASES?
Since the Maryland Court of Appeals seems to allow
proof of rightful possession to support an allegation of
ownership whenever it is important to the decision in a par-
ticular case, it may be argued that the court means "posses-
sion" when it uses the word "ownership," and that no real
problem exists. However, this argument ignores an im-
portant fact - that no one can be sure that the court in
the future in a given case will so interpret the word. A dis-
tinction between the words "ownership" and "possession"
should be made in order to eliminate possible future mis-
conception as to what amounts to the crime of larceny.
As long as the Court of Appeals adheres to the vague rule
that proof of ownership is an essential element of larceny,
there is room for confusion and uncertainty. The Mary-
land Court of Appeals would do well to enunciate a clear,
definitive statement of what it means by "ownership" as
used in larceny cases.39
Deceptive Reference To Manufacturer's List Price As
Unfair Trade Practice
Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC1
Petitioner, a Delaware corporation operating retail
stores in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, including
Maryland, sought review of a cease and desist order issued
against it by the Federal Trade Commission. The order
include any part owner, or person having possession or control of, or a
special property in, anything capable of being stolen. * * * It must be
proved upon the trial, that the goods stolen are the absolute or special
property of the persons named in the indictment."
8 It is true that other courts have used the words "ownership" and
"possession" interchangeably as perhaps the Maryland Court of Appeals
is doing. E.g., People v. Edwards, 72 Cal. App. 102, 236 Pac. 944 (1925).
But the court in this case made it clear that it did not intend to change
the common law definition of the crime. See p. 950: "Considered as an
element of larceny, 'ownership' and 'possession' may be regarded as
synonymous terms; for one who has the right of possession as against
the thief is, so far as the latter is concerned, the owner." This brief
statement shows how simply the problem can be dealt with.
'322 F. 2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
